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Extending MICRA Liability Limitations
To All Negligence Actions: The Case
For Tort Reform
"The tort system is the only element of American society that continues to function as though resources were unlimited."'

In 1975, the California Legislature enacted the Medical Injury Com-

pensation Reform Act (MICRA)l in response to an apparent crisis
in the health care field.3 The perceived crisis was twofold. 4 First, many

insurance companies issuing medical malpractice insurance policies in
California determined that their costs were so high malpractice coverage
1. Address by Robert Willmore, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, National Association of Attorneys General Tort Liability Conference, San Francisco, (June 26, 1985).
2. 1975 Cal. Stat. c. 1, §1, at 3949. During the 1975 Second Extraordinary Session of
the California Legislature called by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., the legislature considered
medical malpractice problems faced by the state. The session was labelled extraordinary because
the legislature met in the interval between regular legislative sessions. Id.
3. Id. at 4007. Recognition by the California Legislature of a crisis is contained in the
preamble to MICRA which states in pertinent part:
The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the State
of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting
in a potential breakdown of the health delivery system, severe hardships for the medically indigent, a denial of access for the economically marginal, and depletion of physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of health care available to citizens
of this state. The Legislature, acting within the scope of its police power, finds the
statutory remedy herein provided is intended to provide an adequate and reasonable
remedy within the limits of what the foregoing public health safety considerations
permit now and into the foreseeable future.
Id. Governor Brown's proclamation to the California Legislature stated in pertinent part:
The cost of medical malpractice insurance has risen to levels which many physicians
and surgeons find intolerable. The inability of doctors to obtain such insurance at
reasonable rates is endangering the health of the people of this State, and threatens
the closing of many hospitals. The longer term consequences of such closings could
seriously limit the health care provided to hundreds of thousands of our citizens.
In my judgment, no lasting solution is possible without sacrifice and fundamental
reform. It is critical that the Legislature enact laws which will change the relationship between the people and the medical profession, the legal profession and the
insurance industry, and thereby reduce the costs which underlie these high insurance
premiums.
Id. at 3947.
4. KEENE, CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 27 (1976); see, e.g., When Doctors Went Out On Strike, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1975, at 4, col. 1 (strike by San Francisco anesthesiologists
angered at rising malpractice insurance costs); see also, When Doctors Rebel Against Higher
Insurance Costs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., January 19, 1976, at 36, col. 2 (work slowdown
by Los Angeles County doctors due to proposed insurance rate increase of 486 percent); see
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could no longer be provided. 5 Some insurers withdrew from the
malpractice field entirely, while others substantially raised premiums.
Sudden cost increases gave rise to the second part of the problem.
Many doctors threatened to stop providing medical care involving high
risk procedures. 6 Others terminated practice or went "bare."" The
result was that full medical care was not available in all areas of the
state, and patients treated by uninsured doctors faced the risk of
obtaining unenforceable judgments if injuries resulted from
malpractice. 8
The combined effect of increased premiums and reduced coverage
on the cost and availability of medical care prompted the California
Legislature to enact MICRA to solve the medical malpractice dilemma. 9
Unfortunately, health care providers are not the only defendants
adversely affected by insurance cost and availability problems. Defendants in general tort actions face similar difficulties." Since the tort
reform provisions of MICRA apply only to certain health care
providers" and are limited to acts of professional negligence,' 2
analogous problems faced by other negligence defendants have gone
also, Shore, Civil Liability Expands in State But Insurance Costs Keep Up Pace, L.A. Daily
Journal, September I1,1978, at 9, col. 1 (pointing out the problems of medical care availability and insurance coverage cost and availability). But see Joint Legislative Audit Committee,
Office of the Auditor General, California Legislature, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis
in California §265.2, at 1 (Dec. 1975) (no real crisis exists); U.S. Department of Health, Education
& Welfare, The Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice 109 (1973) ("a
general consensus exists on the point that medical malpractice, at present, is viewed as a 'crisis'
only by the medical profession"); cf Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 412
(1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). "The Act is a necessary legislative response to a
'crisis in medical malpractice insurance' in Idaho, but the record does not demonstrate any
such crisis." Id.
5. 1975 Cal. Stat. c. 2, §12.5, at 4007.
6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. Practicing "bare" means to practice without malpractice insurance coverage. Barme
v. Wood 37 Cal. 3d 174, 179, 689 P.2d 446, 448-449, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818 (1984); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, 721 (5th ed. 1979). Still other professionals maintained coverage at a minimum
level not commensurate with the risks of practice in light of medical malpractice judgments
in California. This latter group comprised what are commonly referred to as "underinsured."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY at 1368.
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6146 (d)(2). "Health care provider" means any person licensed
or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with §500) of the Business and Professions
Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act,
or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with §1440) of Division 2 of the Health and
Safety Code ...... "Health care provider" includes the legal representatives of a health care
provider .... Id.
12. Id. §6146 (d)(3). "Professional negligence" is a negligent act or omission to act by
a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the
proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within
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unaddressed. High judgment awards,' 3 expanded liability theories,"

and the joint and several liability rule in effect in California' 5 have
created problems for negligence defendants other than medical care

providers. The dilemma is similar to that which confronted the medical
profession at the time MICRA was enacted.' 6
the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction
imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital. Id.
13. In a discussion of a trial court case, Fitzsimmons v. O'Neal, one newspaper noted
that $3.2 million was awarded to plaintiffs in an attorney malpractice suit. Galante, Jury Awards
$3.2 Million In Legal Malpractice, NAT'L L. J., May 6, 1985, Vol. 7, No. 34, at 3,
col. 1, at 10, cols. 4, 5. Of the total award, $2.5 million consisted of punitive damages
for which the defendants were personally liable. Legal observers believe that the only larger
lawyer-malpractice verdict in California was the $3.5 million award returned in 1980 against
former San Francisco Mayor Joseph L. Alioto and his attorney son, Joseph M. Alioto. Id.
Lloyd's of London Chairman Peter North Miller was quoted as saying that the downturn in
Lloyd's profits is attributable not to the "cutthroat" competition for premium income that
has damaged or destroyed many U.S. insurers but to liability litigation and extravagant court
awards in this country. Keppel, Losses, Fraud Hit Lloyd's of London, Los Angeles Times,
June 10, 1985, at IV, 1, cols. 2-3. "Without reform of tort law in the United States, there
will not be a market to cover the liabilities Americans want to see covered." Id.; The combined loss for [legal] malpractice insurance carriers in California last year was between $50 million
and $60 million; and future losses may be greater. One carrier alone is purported to be facing
the prospect of million-dollar-plus verdicts in 55 pending malpractice cases. Kirsch, A Changing Insurance Game Threatens Lawyers, California Lawyer, July 1985, Vol. 5, No. 7, at 31,
32 (quoting Norm Smith, a broker with Capital Workshop Financial Services in San Francisco).
14. See, e.g., Aloy v. Mash 38 Cal. 3d 413, 424, 696 P.2d 656, 663, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162,
169 (1985) (Reynoso J., dissenting). In Aloy, the California Supreme Court ruled that an attorney may be held liable for malpractice even if allegedly incorrect advice given to a client
in an unsettled area of the law is later validated by the courts. In his dissenting opinion, Associate
Justice Cruz Reynoso stated, "pV]here the law is unsettled, the attorney who gives advice later
determined to be correct may well have committed malpractice, while the attorney whose advice turns out to be erroneous may avoid liability entirely." Id.
15. The general policy in California is to afford all citizens protection from negligence.
CAL. CIV. CODE §1714. The joint and several liability rule, in accord with the policy of protection for all, is meant to protect victims of negligence by defendants who lack financial resources
to pay judgments. If one responsible party has the ability to pay for the victim's damages,
then that party, rather than the victim, suffers when other responsible parties cannot pay their
share. American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 587, 578 P.2d
899, 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 187 (1978). For example, in a situation when the plaintiff is
found 30% at fault, the first defendant is found 60% at fault but is unable to pay,
and the second defendant is 10% at fault but has the resources to pay the judgment,
the second defendant pays 70% of the plaintiff's total damages even though that defendant

was only 10% at fault in causing the plaintiff's injuries. W.

PROSSER, HADBOOK OF THE LAw

§47 at 297 (4th ed. 1971). See Sewing Up the Deep Pocket, The Sacramento Bee,
May 4, 1983, at BlI, col. 2 (Sen. John Foran's bill (SB 575) would retain joint liability for
economic damages but would limit liability for noneconomic damages to the defendant's percentage of fault); see also Granelli and Nakaso, Public Bodies Battle to Limit Joint-and-Several
Doctrine, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at 24, col. I (public and private entities urge
abolition of the joint and several liability doctrine); Granelli and Nakaso, Liability: Who Should
Pay Most?, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at B 11, col. 3. Although Los Angeles County
was found only 30% at fault for the injuries sustained by a passenger in a car which rolled
on a county road, under the joint and several liability doctrine the county paid 99%o of the
award of $1.77 million.
16. Keppel, supra note 13 at IV, 1.
OF TORTS
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Cities,

7

counties,

8

the private sector

9

and attorneys 20 are experienc-

17. In a 1983 survey, the League of California Cities found that 84 cities with populations
under 500,000 had paid out in judgments and settlements more than $16.5 million in the three
years preceding the survey. More than $12.5 million was paid in 1982. Cities faced potential
liability amounting to more than $115 million in cases pending in 1983 in which the city had
little or no fault. 1983 Municipal Liability Insurance Survey, LXI, 2 Western City Magazine
3 (February 1985). Subsequent to the 1983 survey, San Diego reported $28 million in pending
litigation. Trim the Cost of Nuisance Suits, San Francisco Examiner, May 3, 1983 at B2, col.
2. The 1983 survey showed that the cities had paid out $4 million in 1980-81 and $12 million
in 1981-82. The increase was computed based on reports from only 20% of the cities
in the state. Los Angeles, San Diego, and other major municipalities were excluded. Id. El
Segundo City Manager Arthur Jones reported the number of claims filed against that city in
1980-81 rose to 55, more than triple the number of the previous year. Needham, Cities Get
Tougher in Accident Suits Because of Number, Cost, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17, 1983, at
B4, col. 3. Mr. Jones indicated the city's insurance agent "has requested a considerable increase in fees for processing claims," with a 50% increase in these fees approved by the City
Council from 1982 to 1983. Id.
18. For example, the 1984-85 insurance premium for the County of Marin was $97,000
with a $250,000 deductible for $30 million liability coverage. For 1985-86, a premium of $448,000
has been quoted with a $500,000 deductible for $15 million in coverage, which excludes all
road liability. Colusa County has a total annual budget of $10 million. Of this amount, $1
million is earmarked for the payment of insurance premiums. Interview with Attorney Mark
Wasser, General Counsel for The County Supervisors Association of California (July 2, 1985)
(notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal). In Orange County, a group of 12 cities that had
formed an insurance pool was given 60 days notice that the carrier, which had decided to
stop writing policies for public entities in California, would cancel coverage. The groups contracted with another insurer for a new group policy that increased rates between 300 and 450
percent for each town, and raised the deductible from $100,000 to $250,000. Industry analysts
predict the new premiums may double in three years. Granelli, and Nakaso, Public Bodies
Battle to Limit Joint-and-Several Doctrine, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 21, 1985 at B11, Col. 3.
19. Over 75 major business, professional and financial organizations filed an amicus curiae
brief for defendant appellant in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, Civil No. 24336 (Cal.
Supreme Court filed Nov. 10, 1981) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal). These organizations,
designated as the Association for California Tort Reform, comprise a statewide coalition dedicated
to the reform of California's tort liability laws. Id.
20. Examples of attorney malpractice insurance problems include a ninefold rate increase
to an annual premium of nearly $1 million for a major Los Angeles firm that now must finance
malpractice coverage with a loan. Galante, Legal Insurance Crisis, Malpractice Rates Zoom,
NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1985, Vol. 7, No. 38, at 1, Col. 1. The firm "never paid a penny" in
a malpractice case. Id. Approximately 14% of the lawyers in California are being sued for
malpractice. This percentage is twice the national average and twice the figure for six years
ago. San Francisco attorney James D. Hadfield, president and CEO of California's Lawyer's
Mutual Insurance Company stated, "The result [has been] a desperate situation" in terms of
policy prices. In high litigation areas such as California, the situation is "getting to the point
where insurance for lawyes won't be availabe at all." Id. at 25. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note
13, at 31 (relating that one San Francisco attorney's premiums have risen from $900 to $3,800
per year). "In general the average yearly premium in California today exceeds $1,300 per lawyer,
and those specializing in the high risk fields (real estate, securities, personal injury, family law,
estate planning and entertainment) are paying up to $3,000 per year for coverage with generous
policy limits." Id. at 33. These premiums are likely to go even higher with estimates ranging
from $2,000 to $10,000 per lawyer per year depending on the type of practice and the size
of the insurer. Id. Ronald E. Mallen, chairman of the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability states: "The existing [malpractice insurance] programs have the capacity to handle about 30,000 attorneys but we're going to have roughly
another 15,000 to 20,000 lawyers who want insurance but can't find it or can't afford it." Id.
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ing insurance coverage reductions, 2 ' substantial premium increases, 22

and higher deductibility thresholds.23 Without immediate reforms in
the tort recovery system, general liability insurance may become unat-

tainably expensive as well as scarce. 2" Insurance coverage problems

already have resulted in cutbacks of government services. 25 Tax

program allocations to payrevenues have been diverted from public
26
judgments.
and
settlements
of
ment
Legislators and citizen groups are pressing for a solution.27 Many

ideas have been offered ranging from piecemeal reform to sweeping
restructure of the California tort recovery system.23 Several proposals

that have been made would extend the basic features of MICRA to
all negligence actions as a means of achieving tort reform and restor-

ing balance to the tort system.29
This comment will explore the four major provisions of MICRA
to determine whether the provisions should be extended to all
negligence actions. 3" The legislative purpose and goals of MICRA,
which parallel current reasons for extending the Act, will be discussed. 3'
21. Fluor Corp., a Fortune 500 company with a subsidiary, Fluor Technology, involved
in toxic waste cleanup, has reported that insurance coverage is no longer available from any
source at any price for pollution-related damages. Coverage for federal Superfund toxic waste
cleanup activities were expressly eliminated from Fluor's former policy. Interview with Diane
R. Smith, Senior Counsel, Fluor Engineers, Inc. (July 1, 1985) (notes on file at the Pacific
Law Journal).
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. Most counties budget tort liability from road appropriations. Therefore, settlements
and judgments paid out are taken from road maintenance funds, depleting the funds available
for necessary road work. Interview with Mark A. Wasser, General Counsel, County Supervisors Association of California (July 2, 1985) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
26. Id.
27. During 1985, numerous proposals were made to the California Legislature to mitigate
the effects of higher judgment awards and increased liability. Examples include SB 75 (ForanBeverly), sponsored by the Association for California Tort Reform, which would hold a defendant liable for noneconomic damages only in proportion to the defendant's degree of fault
as determined by the factfinder. AB 1122 (McAlister) would change the burden of proof to
obtain punitive damages from a "preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and convincing"
evidence. AB 2322 (Grisham) would provide that a nonsettling defendant in a negligence action
cannot be held responsible for more than that defendant's percentage of fault for a plaintiff's
injuries. See, e.g., 1985-86 Regular Session, AB 2505 (Filante), which would extend the four
primary provisions of MICRA to all negligence actions. SB 700 (Maddy) would extend the
sliding contingency fee scale for attorneys' fees in MICRA to all negligence actions. AB 1769
(Grisham) would extend the periodic payment of future damages provision in MICRA to all
negligence actions. See generally 1979-80 Regular session: AB 550, 1715 and 1769; 1981-82
Session: AB 311, SB 1190 and 1191; 1983-84 Session: SB 928 (measures proposed to enact
various tort reforms including MICRA-type limitations on liability and abolition of joint liability
beyond the defendant's proportion of fault).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 57-278 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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The major provisions of MICRA will be reviewed briefly. This comment will propose extension of two MICRA provisions to all negligence
actions.32 First, the enactment of a sliding scale for attorneys' contingency fees will be suggested.33 Next, a provision for periodic payment of future damages will be discussed.3" The MICRA cap on
noneconomic damages and the provision of the Act abrogating the
collateral source rule will not be recommended for extension. This
comment will conclude that extending two of the MICRA provisions
will help restore balance to the California tort recovery system without
compromising the rights of injured plaintiffs. In addition, extending
the provisions would have a beneficial impact on general liability
insurance rates similar to the impact of MICRA on medical malpractice insurance rates. 35 Extension of MICRA provisions to all negligence
actions would reduce overall costs of coverage to insurers and would
thereby indirectly reduce premium costs to consumers. 6
MICRA PROVISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE

PURPOSE

The rationale behind the MICRA provisions can best be understood
by examining the purpose of the Act. This analysis is important in
determining the advisability of extending MICRA provisions, because
the purposes served by extension would parallel the purposes identified by the legislature when MICRA was enacted. 7 California
legislators believed that MICRA would stabilize or reduce the costs
underlying high medical malpractice premiums." Rate stability would
assure the availability of an adequate number of health care providers
and a sufficient source of recovery for those injured by medical
malpractice. 9 The goals of the legislature are reflected in the following major provisions of MICRA.
A.

Limitation on Contingency Fee Agreements

MICRA placed limits on the amount of attorneys' fees that could
be collected on a contingency basis in medical malpractice cases. 4"
These limits apply whether the plaintiff's recovery is by settlement,
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-114 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 115-213 and accompanying text.
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6146.
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arbitration, or judgment." The sliding scale of MICRA provides that

attorneys may charge forty percent of the first $50,000 recovered;
thirty-three and a third percent of the next $50,000 recovered; twenty-

five percent of the next $100,000 recovered; and ten percent of, any
amount of the recovery that exceeds $200,000.2
B.

Periodic Payment of Future Damages
At the request of either the defendant or the plaintiff in a medical

malpractice lawsuit, the court must enter judgment ordering that future
damages be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments,

3

rather

than by lump sum, if the award equals or exceeds $50,000 in future
damages." Money damages awarded for the compensation of lost
future wages may not be reduced or terminated by the death of the

injured plaintiff. " The future
earnings award must be paid to
6
dependents of the plaintiff.

C. Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule
In a medical malpractice lawsuit, the defendant may elect to
introduce evidence of any monies to which the plaintiff is entitled
in addition to the recovery obtainable from the defendant.4 MICRA
provides that the award to the plaintiff may be reduced by any amount
previously recovered from a collateral source for the same injury.4 8
In contrast, the traditional collateral source rule bars evidence of injury
compensation received by a plaintiff from a source independent of
the tortfeasor. 9 Thus, no reduction of judgments due to collateral source
41. Id., §6146(d)(1).
42. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6146(a). See, Jenkins & Schweinfurth, California's Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal ProtectionChallenge, 52 So. CAL. L.R. 829, 838,
n. 64, (1979). For example, if plaintiff X receives a judgment of $1 million, under the provisions of MICRA, X's attorney could contract for or collect $141,666 or approximately 14%
of plaintiff's recovery. The average national contingency fee collected by an attorney for a
$1 million judgment is $333,000, or from $333,000 to $500,000 on a sliding contingency fee
basis, depending on whether the case actually progressed through trial or was appealed.
43. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §667.7. The authorization of periodic payments is conditioned
on the judgment debtor's ability to post adequate security. Id. Failure to make periodic payments
renders the judgment debtor in contempt of court and liable for damages resulting from nonpayment. Id.
44. Id. §667.7 (e)(1).
45. Id. §667.7 (c); cf. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W. 432, 434, 457
(1978) (Day, J., dissenting) (periodic payments ending at claimant's death).
46. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §667.7(c).
47. CAL. CIV. CODE §3333.1.
48. Id.
49. Kirtland & Packard v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. App. 3d
140, 145-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1976). See generally Moceri & Messina, The Collateral

Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17

recovery results." Payments that may be introduced into evidence under
MICRA include Social Security, state or federal disability income,
workers' compensation, health or income-disability insurance, accident insurance providing health benefits or income-disability coverage,
and any contract entitling plaintiff to payment of or reimbursement
for medical services." If the defendant elects to introduce evidence
of collateral sources, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of any
amount paid to secure the plaintiff's right to the insurance benefits., 2
However, the collateral source may not recover from the malpractice
defendant or the plaintiff for any amount already paid, through either
indemnity or subrogation. 3
D.

Cap on Recovery of Noneconomic Damages

MICRA placed a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. 4
Noneconomic damages include pain and suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damages
resulting from medical malpractice. 5 The MICRA cap does not apply
to economic damages such as medical expenses or lost earnings resulting
6
from the injury.
MICRA PROVISIONS RECOMMENDED FOR EXTENSION
Reports from governmental entities, 7 attorneys,58 and the private
sector59 indicate a problem of increasing liability insurance premium
costs and decreasing coverage availability. These difficulties are
analogous to the dilemma faced by the health care profession in preMICRA years.6" If the problems remain unsolved, California citizens
may be forced to bear the risk of their own losses from ordinary
Source Rule in PersonalInjury Litigation, 7 GONZ. L. REv. 310, (1972) (the collateral source
rule is widely accepted in most jurisdictions notwithstanding that application of the rule may
result in a so-called double recovery).
50. Kirtland & Packard, 59 Cal. App.3d 140, 145-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421.
51. Cal. Civ. Code §3333.1.
52. Id. Insurance premiums are an example of the plaintiff's admissable evidence in a
medical malpractice action. Id.
53. Id.
54. CAL. CIV. CODE §3333.2 (b).
55. Id.
56. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 159, 695 P.2d 665, 680, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 383 (1985).
57. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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negligence. Insurance may not be available to cover all risks or may
be too costly for many people.

Two of the four major MICRA provisions, if extended to all
negligence actions, would help solve the current dilemma of rising

insurance premium costs and shrinking insurance availability. The two
provisions recommended for extension are limits on attorney
62
contingency fees6" and the provision for periodic payment of damages.
The actual relief that would result from an extension cannot be
forecast precisely. 63 Industry analysts predicted, however, that

medical malpractice payouts would decrease by twenty percent after
the 1975 enactment of MICRA. 4 Empirical evidence from some states

showed awards decreased as much as fifty percent from 1975 to 1977.65
After MICRA was enacted, insurers were able to halt increases in

6
malpractice insurance rates because of lower payouts and settlements.

In fact, one appellate court acknowledged that medical malpractice
premiums went down by twenty-five percent without adjusting for

inflation after the enactment of MICRA. 67 Analogous provisions
extended to all negligence cases may be expected to have a similar

effect on liability insurance premiums in general. Steps toward reform,
beginning with the extension of selected MICRA provisions, would

improve the capability of the tort system to meet the needs for which

61. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
62. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §667.7(f).
63. The American Bar Association estimated that one of the MICRA provisions, abrogation of the collateral source rule, alone would reduce medical malpractice payouts by up to
20%. An empirical study following 1985 medical malpractice reforms nationwide showed
that in states requiring reduction of awards by the amount of collateral source payments, payouts
dropped 50% from 1975 to 1977. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law
of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 939, 946 (1984).
64. Id. at 947. A smaller reduction in medical malpractice awards resulted from the cap
on noneconomic damages. Id. States that enacted caps in 1975 had malpractice awards 19%
lower in 1977. Id.
65. Id. at 948. In addition to this finding, economists who have studied states that enacted
limitations on attorneys' contingent fees concluded that the limits have increased the number
of cases dropped by five percent, decreased the size of settlements by nine percent, and reduced by eleven percent the number of cases tried. The MICRA provisions taken together resulted
in a 25% decline in medical malpractice premiums for most hospitals in the state in
the years following enactment of MICRA. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital
of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 382-83, 683 P.2d 670, 685, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671,
686 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (1984).
66. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d. at 382-383, 683 P.2d at 685, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
67. Id. at 382-383, 683 P.2d at 685, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (1984); Brief of Amicus Curiae,
Fred J. Hiestand at 7, American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los GatosSaratoga, Inc., Civil No. 24171 (Cal. Supreme Court filed Aug. 9, 1983) (on file at the Pacific
Law Journal).
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the system was established."8 Each MICRA provision will be analyzed
individually in the context of extension, beginning with the limitation
on contingency fees and followed by the periodic payments provision. Policy considerations will be addressed first, followed by discussion of constitutional questions.
A.

Extension of the Limitation on Contingency Fees

The first MICRA provision proposed for extension to all negligence
actions is the sliding scale limitation on contingent attorneys' fees.
The United States is one of very few nations that permits plaintiffs'
attorneys to set fees as a percentage of either court awards or
settlements. 9 The medical malpractice insurance crisis provided the
impetus for enactment of the MICRA limitation on contingency fees.70
By enacting the contingency fee limitation, the California Legislature
decreased the high cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums
which threatened the availability of medical care. 7 In addition, the
legislature sought to avoid potential recovery problems created by
insufficient liability coverage for patients injured by medical
malpractice. 7" The legislature determined that the limited sliding fee
scale of MICRA would reduce costs to malpractice defendants and
insurers, particularly in the large number of cases resolved through
settlement.73 Since the attorney fee limitation of MICRA7 4 permits
an attorney a smaller portion of the settlement, plaintiffs may be more
likely to agree to a lower settlement.75 In addition, the limit on
attorneys' fees deters attorneys from litigating marginal cases or
encouraging clients to hold out for unrealistically high settlements.76
Certain immutable characteristics of the contingency fee arrangement have made this method of compensation the subject of vigorous
debate over the years.77 The confluence of interest between attorney
and client bound by a contingency fee agreement is marginal.7" In
68. Report of the California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability
Balance, Sept. 1977, at 141.
69. Id. at 159. For example, Great Britain has banned the contingency fee. Id.
70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 930-32, 695 P.2d 164, 170-71, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 83-84 (1985).
74. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6146.
75. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 695 P.2d at 166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
76. Id. at 930-31, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
77. MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services 39 (1964).
78. Id.
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fact, conflicts of interest are inherent in the contingency fee
arrangement.7 9 Since the fee is paid regardless of the amount of time
spent on the case, early settlement may be advantageous to the
attorney, especially when a small claim is involved. Extensive bargaining
or a trial might yield a higher recovery for the plaintiff, but the additional amount of compensation to the attorney may be insignificant or wholly disproportionate to the amount of time necessary to
pursue the claim. 8"
Those opposed to extending MICRA argue that giving a smaller
percentage to the attorney representing a plaintiff with high damages
in a negligence action actually harms the plaintiff." The rationale
is that attorneys will not vigorously prosecute or even undertake cases
if compensation per unit of time expended is insufficient.8 2 This argument is not supported by evidence obtained from jurisdictions in which
fee limitations are applied. For example, New Jersey has adopted a
sliding contingency fee scale for all tort actions.83 Despite a fee scale
that was even less generous to attorneys than the MICRA scale when
it was adopted, no problems resulting from the fee limitation were
reported in New Jersey." In fact, commentators in New Jersey have
indicated that New Jersey's limited contingency fee detractors were
wrong in predicting that the poor would suffer impaired access to
the courts.8 5
Contingency fee arrangements are not as risky for the attorney as
the name suggests.8 6 A noted authority states that plaintiffs recover,
either by suit or settlement, in the vast majority of cases in which
a lawyer is retained. 7 The argument for limitation of contingency
79. Id. Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal
Injury Litigation 22 STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1136-39 (1970); Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fred J.
Hiestand at 4, Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Civil No. S.F. 24435 (Cal. Supreme Court filed
Aug. 10, 1982) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
80. MacKinnon, supra note 77 at 198.
81. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fred J. Hiestand at 17, Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Civil
No. S.F. 24435 (Cal. Supreme Court filed Aug. 10, 1982) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
82. Id.
83. The percentage of the recovery permitted for attorneys' contingency fees has been increased by the New Jersey Legislature since the original enactment of a sliding scale limiting
contingency fees. NEw JERSEY RULES OF GENERAL APPLICATION,

1:21-7, 1984.

84. Id.
85. New Jersey's Maximum Contingent Fee Schedules: The Validity of Rule 1:21-7, 5 RuT.CAM. 534 (1974). "The [New Jersey] rule's detractors may have overstated their objections
by predicting impaired access of the poor to the courts." Id. at 549.
86. Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery 145 (1979). In other words, "there is very little that
is contingent about the contingent fee." Id.
87. Id., citing address by Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Columbia Law School, American
Bar Association Convention (1976).
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fees is strongest when recovery is almost certain. 8
Since 1975 California legislators have repeatedly offered bills for
consideration that would limit or regulate contingency fees. 9 The
MICRA scale is the most reasonable quantitative proposal offered
thus far, and should be extended to all negligence actions. 9 In addition, constitutional challenges to MICRA have been met successfully
and similar constitutional challenges to a MICRA extension can be
overcome.
The contingency fee limitation of MICRA was upheld as constitu-

tional by the California Supreme Court in Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group.9

Roa was one of a recent series of cases involving the

constitutionality of the various MICRA provisions. 92 The Court in
Roa applied a rational basis standard of review to hold that the sliding
scale for contingency fees was not a denial of due process or a violation of equal protection.93 The rational basis standard of review is
the lower tier of the traditional two-tier approach to judicial review
of legislation on constitutional challenges. 9 In order to meet the

rational basis standard of review, the statute being challenged must
bear a rational relation to any conceivable legitimate state interest."
88. Id.
89. The legislature considered at least nine bills seeking to limit or regulate contingent
fees in 1975. They ranged from AB 7 (no maximum schedule but subject to court approval)
to AB 14, 1672 (a flat 10%'o except that counsel and client may split the first $1,667
any way they wish). See also SB 407, SB 397, AB 1, AB 926 and AB 1941 (on ile at Pacific
Law Journal).
90. Report of the Committee on Medical Professional Liability, 102 ABA Annual Rep.
786, 851 (1977). See also Dept. of HEW Report of Secretary's Committee on Medical Malpractice 919730 pp. 34-35; Kohlman, An Equitable Contingency Fee Contract 50 STATE BAR J.
268, 295-98, n.42 (1975). A sliding scale approach has been recommended as the preferable
form of regulation. Attorneys fees should be related to the amount of legal work and expense
involved in handling a case and not to the fortuity of the plaintiff's economic status and degree
of injury. A decreasing maximum schedule of attorney's fees, set on a state by state basis
and reasonably generous in the lower recovery ranges, would prevent the denial of access to
legal representation. Id.
91. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985). Upon a denial of petition
for rehearing on the date of judgment, February 7, 1985, plaintiff/appellants petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari on the ground that Business & Professions Code §6146 violates
the first and fourteenth amendments of the US. Constitution. Docket A85216 U.S. filed July
12, 1985 (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
92. Other cases included American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los
Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984) (upholding
the MICRA provision authorizing periodic payment of future damages in medical malpractice
actions); Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984) (upholding
the MICRA provision that bars a collateral source from obtaining reimbursement from a medical
malpractice defendant).
93. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 695 P.2d at 166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
94. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 657-897 (9th ed.
1975); Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,
50 So. CAL. L.R. 689 (1977).
95. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852
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Application of the rational basis standard of review includes extreme
97
deference to the legislature 96 and a presumption of constitutionality.

In addition, the burden of proving the statutory classification
unconstitutional is on the party challenging the statute. 98 Historical-

ly, the rational basis test has been applied to economic and social

welfare legislation.9 9 Since MICRA relates to public health care, the
statute is appropriately analyzed under the rational basis standard of

review.' 00
In contrast to the rational basis test, the strict scrutiny standard

of review requires that the challenged legislation be necessary to serve
a compelling state interest. 1"' The strict scrutiny test has been applied

when legislative classifications impinge on suspect classes0 2 or
fundamental rights.0 3 The legislative classifications in MICRA do not
require application of the strict scrutiny standard of review0 4 because

neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is affected by the Act.
Therefore, the rational basis test has been chosen repeatedly by courts

reviewing medical malpractice legislation'

5

and was applied by the

06
California Supreme Court in the four MICRA challenge cases.1

(1970); accord, McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (presumption of constitutionality; statutory classifications deemed unconstitutional only if no circumstances
reasonably may be conceived for justification); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
96. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
97. See, e.g., McGowan, 336 U.S. at 420.
98. See, e.g., Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79.
99. G. Gunther, supra note 94, at 658; Larson, Constitutional Law: Equal ProtectionAn Emerging Standard of Review, 13 WASHBuRN L.J. 106, 107 (1974).
100. See, e.g., Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 695 P.2d at 166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
101. L. TRiBE, AAmRICAN CONSrUTIONAL LAW, §16-4 at 1000-02 (1978).
102. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Classifications are considered suspect when the class is subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or is relegated to a position of political powerlessness so as to need special protection from the majoritarian political process. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that suspect
classifications include those made on the basis of race. Id. Classifications based upon alienage
are considered suspect. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-43 (1915). National origin classifications also are deemed suspect and may not be used to deny equal protection. Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-80 (1954).
103. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 33-34. Fundamental rights are those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Id.
104. D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners 11 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 520 P.2d 10, 22-31 Cal.
Rptr. 786, 798-99 (1974) (right to practice medicine not fundamental); Jones v. State Board
of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (limits on recovery for medical malpractice
neither infringe a fundamental right nor affect a suspect class), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977);
Paro v. Longwood Hospital, 369 N.E. 2d 985, 987- 88 (1977) (classifications made under malpractice act do not violate equal protection 'clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution).
105. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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Applying the rational basis standard, the court in Roa stated the

legislature could reasonably have concluded MICRA's sliding scale
limitation on attorneys' fees would be more equitable than a flat contingency fee. 07 The sliding scale ensures that an attorney does not

receive a "windfall" simply because a client is seriously injured.'
In order to relate an attorney's fee more closely to the amount of
legal work and expense involved in a case and less to the plaintiff's
economic status and degree of injury, a decreasing schedule of fees
should be set by each state. The schedule should be generous with
regard to smaller awards so potential plaintiffs are not deprived of
representation.' 9 The sliding scale guarantees that the most seriously
injured plaintiffs will retain the largest share of any recovery secured
on their behalf." '
The rationale in Roa for upholding the constitutionality of the
MICRA contingency fee limitation can be applied to all negligence
actions."' The limitation does not infringe on the right of negligence
victims to retain counsel." ' The provision merely places a limit on
the compensation an attorney may receive when representing an injured
plaintiff under a contingency fee arrangement." 3 The validity of
legislative regulation of attorneys' fees is well established" 4 and the
constitutionality of this limiting regulation as an exercise of the police
power has been settled."' Therefore, extension of the limitation on
attorneys' contingency fees can be supported.
107. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 933, 695 P.2d at 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
108. Id. at 929, 933, 695 P.2d at 169, 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82, 85.
109. Report of Committee on Medical Professional Liability, 102 ABA Annual Rep. 786,
851 (1977).
110. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 929, 933, 695 P.2d at 169, 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82, 85.
111. Statutory limitations on attorneys' fees are not uncommon, either in California or
other states. See, e.g., American Trial Lawyers v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258,
330 A.2d 350 (1974); Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y. 2d 97, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 491, 160 N.E. 2d 43 (1958),
appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 374 (1960). In California, attorneys' fees have long been regulated
both in workers' compensation proceedings (LAB.CODE §4906) and in probate proceedings (Prob.
Code §§910, 911). Other states have already adopted maximum fee schedules that apply to
all personal injury contingency fee arrangements. Id. In addition, the United States Congress
has passed several laws limiting the amount of attorney fees chargeable in various types of
cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §2678 (1966) (limit on attorneys' fees in actions under the Federal
Tort Claims Act); 42 U.S.C. §406 (b)(1) (1968) (limit on attorneys' fees in actions under the
Social Security Act); 38 U.S.C. §3404 (1958) (limit on attorneys' fees for claims under the
Veterans' Benefit Act).
112. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 929, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82.
113. Id. at 929, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82.
114. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920).
115. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 926-927, 695 P.2d at 166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80. See, e.g.,
Frisbie v. U.S., 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895) (attorneys must accept limited fees for the processing of federal pension claims); Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 541 (1925) (state may place
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B.

Extension of the Periodic Payment Provision

The second MICRA provision proposed for extension by this comment is the periodic payment of judgments or settlements equal to

or exceeding $50,000 in future damages. '

6

California law authorizes

courts to order payment of judgments in periodic installments in cases

of spousal support, workers' compensation, and medical malpractice
cases."I7 Periodic payments are not allowed in other types of actions." 8

MICRA provides that if an award of future damages exceeds
$50,000, then at the request of either party the court shall order
periodic payment of the portion of the judgment designated to com-

pensate future losses." 9 If the judgment debtor is inadequately insured,
the court must require the posting of security to assure full payment
of the award.' 20 Furthermore, should future damages be comprised
of future earnings, death of the judgment creditor' 2 ' will not defeat
payment to surviving heirs.' 22 Future damages for care and treatment
revert to the judgment debtor if the judgment creditor dies before
the court-alloted time, 123 thus preventing a "windfall" of continuing
care benefits to survivors. '24
The $50,000 threshold of MICRA was intended to mitigate the
problem faced by liability insurers forced to liquidate large investments
quickly to satisfy judgments.' 25 By allowing payment as future damages
accrue, insurance companies could maintain small ready reserve
accounts and plan investments based on orderly and reasonable payconditions on licenses to practice law as it believes necessary to protect the public good); Margolin
v. U.S., 269 U.S. 93, 102 (1925) (Congress may set limits on fees received by attorneys for
services rendered to beneficiaries under the War Risk Insurance Act); Estate of Goodrich, 6
Cal. App. 730, 732, 93 P. 121, 123 (1907) (statutory ceilings on attorneys' fees are constitutionally valid under the appropriate rational basis analysis).
116. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §667.7.
117. Report of the California Citizens Commission on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability
Balance, supra note 68, at 149.
118. Id.
119. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §667.7 (a).
120. Id.
121. A judgment creditor is one who has obtained a judgment in a case, under which execution may be enforced. Black's Law Dictionary, 758 (5th ed. 1979).
122. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §667.7 (c).
123. Id. §667.7 (d).
124. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §667.7 (f). See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fred J. Hiestand at
25, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, Civil No. S.F. 24336 (Cal. Supreme Court filed Nov.
10, 1981) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
125. The problem is wide-ranging in economic impact because if insurers are forced to liquidate investments quickly to satisfy a judgment, they often must sell interests at a less favorable
rate than is available for more stable, long term investments. This forced sale results in less
income from investments and a correlative need to increase premiums to offset the difference.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fred J. Hiestand, supra note 124, at 30 (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
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ment schedules.' 2 6 Moreover, high rates of return could be realized

on larger investments kept in long-term accounts.' 27 The ultimate effect
would be a reduction of insurance premiums. 2 '
An analogous problem to that of insurers is faced by the uninsured or underinsured defendant' 29 since payment of a large judgment in a lump sum can force bankruptcy.'30 If periodic payments
are permitted, the judgment debtor may survive financially and still
be able to meet obligations to the plaintiff.' 3 ' If deprived of the option
of periodic payments, a defendant might be forced to liquidate assets
immediately on unfavorable terms in order to pay a judgment.' 32 The
defendant's obligations could be met with much greater ease and certainty if payments were spread over the applicable years.' 33
During hearings prior to the enactment of MICRA, the legislature
recognized benefits derived by both plaintiffs and defendants through
periodic payments. 34 Legislators were keenly aware that lump sum
awards can be dissipated easily in frivolous expenditures and luxuries,
rather than spent on substitutes for losses caused by injuries.'" A

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
130. Report of the California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability
Balance, supra note 68, at 150.
131. If payments are made periodically, the necessity of liquidating assets immediately on
potentially unfavorable terms is eliminated; thus, judgments are met with greater ease and certainty. Id.
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. Testimony of Howard Hassard, Attorney at Law, Hearings of the Select Committee
on Medical Malpractice, Nov. 8, 1974, pp. 70, 71.
... Under the funding mechanism which is applied by our courts ....
the use of
the lump-sum judgment on a speculative basis ... is not applied to the individual
but only to the [statistically] average [person] ... The Legislature should at least
give the authority, if not mandate, that the courts provide for a basis for giving
life income ... and be allowed to fund it to a life income payment ... These damages
then would relate to the individual, to his needs as long as he needed them, and
not [be] based on that [hypothetical] average individual who does not exist as such.
Id. See Testimony of Monsignor Timothy O'Brien, Chairman, Insurance Committee of the
California Hospital Association, Hearings of the Select Committee on Medical Malpractice,
Feb. 18, 1975, p. 46.... . . [T]he authorization of judgments providing for periodic rather than
lump-sum payments ... insures that funds will be continually available for the benefit of the
insured claimant." Id. Other commentators support periodic payments, citing advantages to
both plaintiffs and defendants. See generally Comment, Variable PeriodicPayments of Damages:
An Alternative to Lump Sum Awards, 64 IOWA L. REv. 138 (1978); Lilly, Alternatives to Lump
Sum Payments in Personal Injury Cases, 44 INS. CouNsEL J. 243 (1977); Sedgwick & Judge,
The Use of Annuities in Settlement of PersonalInjury Cases, 41 INs. COUNSEL J. 584 (1974).
135. J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 22, 23 (1979). A number of commentators and
studies also note that a disturbingly high percentage of seriously injured tort victims who recover
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recent study of 1,700 accident victims' disposal of lump sum settlement payments concluded that this disposition does not assure a stable
substitute for lost wages incurred due to injuries.' 3 6 Thus, the evidence
suggests that periodic payments enhance an individual's certainty of
having money available for future damages actually incurred.
Counterarguments to the periodic payment provision include the
plaintiff's alleged right to control his or her own recovery. However,
the California Supreme Court has responded to this argument by
holding that a tort plaintiff has no protectable property right in either
the measure or the timing of damages.' 37 Although the legislature might
have chosen a different means to contain medical malpractice insurance
costs, the courts cannot strike down a statute because of a disagreement with the wisdom of the law or because a better way to solve
the problem may exist.' 3 8 Correction of ill-considered legislation must
'
be effected through a responsive legislature. 39
Awards payable in installments or "structured awards," are in
general use in at least six states and many foreign countries.' 40 Periodic
payments have been used voluntarily in several large California tort
cases in which the parties settled the issues before trial.' 4 ' Periodic
payments are reasonable because awards are intended to provide for
the support, treatment, and economic indemnification of the injured
plaintiff in future years.' 2 The awards are not intended to provide
adequate source
a large one-time payment. 41 Periodic payments are an
44
for compensation of future losses as they occur.'
Juries presently are confronted with long and technical arguments
with respect to average life expectancy and the range of possible interest
rates by which a lump sum award should be discounted in order to
determine how much money must be paid today to yield a particular
lump sum awards spend their recovery within a relatively short time after receipt and long
before their period of disability and resulting need has ended. See, e.g., MIcmonoA LAW RviSION COMMISSION, 10TH ANNUAL REPORT, RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DAMAGE PAYMENTS (1976)
at 129; REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK (1976), at 43-44; STATE OF OREGON INTERIM TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, REPORT (1976), at 363; HARPER & JAMS, THE LAW OF TORTS §25.2 (1956).
136. J. O'CONNELL, THE LAwsurr LOTTERY 22, 23.
137. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 166-67, 695 P.2d at 686, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
138. Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 437-39, 629 P.2d 8, 12-13, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500,
504-505 (1981).
139. Id. at 438, 629 P.2d at 12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
140. Report of the California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability
Balance, supra note 68, at 149.
141. Id. at 150.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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income supplement in ten or twenty years.' 45 Predicting the life expectancy of an individual is a highly speculative activity despite
sophisticated tables citing averages.' 6 Moreover, making an accurate
prediction of life expectancy when the plaintiff has suffered an injury
serious enough to warrant a large award for future losses creates additional difficulties. 47 Jury guesswork has resulted in a number of
windfalls to beneficiaries whose financial dependence and emotional
ties to the deceased plaintiff have been slight or nonexistent.' 4 8
The purposes of justice and proper compensation would be met
more effectively if periodic payments were required for future damages
in all negligence cases.' 49 Adoption of periodic payments would provide stability for defendants and insurers, releasing larger amounts
of capital for investment and ultimately reducing premium costs. 5 '
One of the goals of MICRA was to serve the policy interest of providing stability for insurers and defendants, which would encourage
long-term investments.' 5 ' Extending the MICRA provision for periodic
payments would serve the similar policy interest of economic stability
for general liability insurers and defendants in nonmedical malpractice cases. Policy interests, however, are only part of the necessary
analysis in determining whether to extend the periodic payment provision to all negligence actions. Constitutional questions also must
be analyzed in the context of extending the provision for periodic
payment of future damages.
In both American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of
Los Gatos-Saratoga,Inc.' 2 and Fein v. PermanenteMedical Group, "3
the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of MICRA's
periodic payment provision by applying a rational basis standard of
review."' The rationale of the-court in American Bank & Trust and
Fein can be applied to support the constitutionality of an extension
145. Id. The degree of difficulty in making these calculations is, of course, debatable. Nevertheless, support exists for the position that these calculations are far from simple and are in
no way individuated. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148. Report of the California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability
Balance, supra note 68, at 150 (discussing pitfalls of lump sum judgments).
149. This view is consistent with the evidence that using average life expectancy tables can
result in a windfall inheritance of future damages to beneficiaries of the injured plaintiff. See
supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
152. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
153. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
154. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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of the periodic payment provision.

55

The periodic payment provision

had been challenged in both cases on the ground that the provision
violated equal protection guarantees by impermissibly discriminating

between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims. 15 6 In
addition, in both cases challengers claimed the provision violated due
process rights of malpractice victims' 57 and the sixth amendment jury

trial guarantee. 58 A final argument made by plaintiffs in American
Bank & Trust, was that the MICRA provision for periodic payments
was unconstitutionally void for vagueness because a question remained
regarding trial court formulation of a comprehensive payment schedule
without the benefit of detailed special jury verdicts.' 59
The court in American Bank & Trust responded to the objection
that the periodic payment provision discriminated against medical
malpractice plaintiffs by holding that no violation of equal protection or due process guarantees occurred.160 The rationale of the court
was that a rational relation existed between the periodic payments
required by the act and the legislative purpose sought to be served.' 6 '
The requisite rational relation was found since the periodic payment
of future damages furthers the fundamental goal of matching losses
with compensation.' 62 This result is accomplished because money is
paid to an injured plaintiff when the plaintiff incurs the anticipated
expenses or losses in the future.' 63 The legitimate state interest of reduc155. "It is true, of course, that a periodic payment of damages procedure could reasonably
be applied across the entire tort spectrum; as already noted, there have been a variety of proposals advocating just such a general form." American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d 359,
371, 683 P.2d 670, 677, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 678 (1984). See generally Elligent, The Periodic
Payment of Judgments 46 INs. COUNSEL J. 130 (1979) (Many states have enacted provisions
authorizing the periodic payment of damages in a variety of tort fields).
156. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 364, 371, 377, 683 P.2d at 672-73, 677-78,
681-82, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74, 678-79, 682-83.
157. Id. at 368, 369, 683 P.2d at 675-76, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 676-77; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at
158-59, 695 P.2d at 680-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
158. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 376, 683 P.2d at 680, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82,
Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 159, 695 P.2d at 680-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
159. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 377, 683 P.2d at 681-82, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 682-83;
Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 158-59, 695 P.2d at 680-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
160. The plaintiff in American Bank & Trust argued that the periodic payment provision
violated due process because periodic payments diminished the value of the malpractice action
without providing an adequate "quid pro quo." American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 368,
683 P.2d at 675-76, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 676-77. The court held, however, that under settled
constitutional principles, balancing the benefits against the detriments of legislation in determining validity under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution is unnecessary and inappropriate. Id. at 369, 683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
161. Id. at 369, 683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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ing the cost of medical malpractice insurance'" is served by limiting
a defendant's obligation to paying for future losses actually experienced

by the plaintiff. 6 ' The $50,000 threshold required to trigger the periodic
payment provision of MICRA166 was also found to be rationally related

to legitimate state interests because periodic payments of smaller future
damage claims are not cost efficient to administer.' 6 7 The court in

American Bank & Trust noted that the constitutionality of a legislative
measure does not depend upon assessment by the court of the em-

pirical success or failure of the provision. 6 Therefore, even if the
MICRA enactment had not yielded quantifiable positive results 69 in
relation to the legislative goal of bringing down malpractice insurance
costs,' the periodic payment provision still would withstand constitutional judicial scrutiny."'

In answer to the argument that medical malpractice plaintiffs were
being singled out for differential treatment, the court in American
Bank & Trust used the rationale of Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma.' The United States Supreme Court in Williamson held
that "one step at a time" solutions to a state's problems are constitutionally permissible. ' While singling out medical malpractice plaintiffs constituted a permissible single step toward solving malpractice

insurance problems,'

74

the court noted in American Bank & Trust

that the legislature could reasonably apply periodic payments to all
tort cases. 75 Advocates of extension of the MICRA provisions to all

negligence actions have commented that the objection to differential
treatment of plaintiffs is overcome by extending the MICRA provi-

sions to all tort actions.'

6

Extension was not required, however, for

164. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
165. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 369, 683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
166. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
167. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 369, 683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
168. Id. at 375, 683 P.2d at 680, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
169. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
171. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 375, 683 P.2d at 680, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
172. 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
173. The equal protection clause does not prohibit a legislature from implementing a reform
measure "one step at a time," Id. The equal protection clause does not prevent the legislature
"from striking the evil where it is felt most." Werner v. Southern California Newspaper, 35
Cal. 2d 121, 132, 216 P.2d 825, 832 (1950).
174. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
175. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 371, 683 P.2d at 677-78, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79.
176. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Association for California Tort Reform by Fred J. Hiestand
at 2, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, Civil No. S.F. 24336 (Cal. Supreme Court filed Nov.
10, 1981) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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periodic payments to be found constitutional in the medical malprac77
tice setting.
The court in American Bank & Trust also held that no violation
of the due process rights of malpractice victims resulted from periodic
payments.' 8 The court reasoned that the provision is rationally related
to the legitimate state interests of reducing malpractice insurance
costs. 79 For example, a defendant's obligation is limited to future
damages the plaintiff actually incurs.' As a result, a potential windfall to the plaintiff's heirs that can follow from lump sum payments
is avoided. The cost associated with indirect payment to persons other
than the injured plaintiff is one of many factors which increase
insurance premiums."' By eliminating this cost, the state's interest
in reducing insurance premiums is served.'
Another constitutional challenge to MICRA in American Bank &
Trust was that periodic payments violate the sixth amendment jury
trial guarantee.I 3 The language of MICRA apparently authorizes the
court to set the amount of future damages subject to periodic
payment. 8 4 Although trial court discretion is broad, authorizing the
court to decide future damages constitutes an impermissible "impair
ment of the substantial features of a jury trial" or an "improper
interference with the jury's decision."' 8 5 The court in American Bank
& Trust answered this constitutional challenge by construing the act

177. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
178. The court stated that the legislature could reasonably have concluded that periodic
payments would further the fundamental goal of matching losses with compensation by helping
ensure that money paid to an injured plaintiff would be available when the plaintiff incurred
the anticipated expenses or losses in the future. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 372,
683 P.2d at 678, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
182. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 372, 683 P.2d at 676-77, 204 Cal. Rptr. at
677-678.
183. Plaintiff in American Bank & Trust contended that the sixth amendment jury trial
guarantee requires the jury to fix the amount of future damages and make special findings
on any subsidiary issue that affects the structuring of a periodic payment schedule. As enacted,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §667.7 is ambiguous as to the roles the legislature intended the jury
and court to play in the formulation of a periodic payment judgment. While the jury is to
determine the plaintiff's total damages and the court is to fashion the details of the periodic
payment schedule, the statute is not clear whether the jury or the court is to determine the
amount of the future damage component of the total award. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal.
3d at 376, 683 P.2d at 680, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 377, 683 P.2d at 681-82, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 682-83. If the court adopted the
defendant's interpretation of the statute as authorizing the trial court rather than the jury to
fix the amount of future damages subject to periodic payment, then the statute would be an
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to avoid any doubt regarding constitutionality. 8 6 The court concluded

that the MICRA periodic payment provision embodied in Code of
Civil Procedure section 667.7 should be interpreted to require the jury
to designate the portion of the verdict that is intended to compensate
the plaintiff for future damages.' 87Construction of the statute to allow
courts to schedule payments after the jury designates future damages
is reasonable because this construction maintains the province of the
jury to ascertain the amount of damages awarded.' 88 Only the manner in which the judgment is to be paid is affected by the periodic
payment provision. 8 9 Moreover, the periodic payment provision intrudes into the realm of the jury less than the well accepted provisions of additur and remittitur,' 90 which were held constitutional by
the California Supreme Court in Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co.' 9 ' The
power of additur to increase and the corollary power of remittitur
to decrease the award is a significant alteration of the jury's verdict.,9 2
Nevertheless, additur and remittitur are permissible intrusions into the
province of the jury.1 91
The court in American Bank & Trust also rejected the constitutional challenge that the periodic payment provision was void for
vagueness.1' 9 In structuring a periodic payment schedule to meet the
unconstitutional infringement on the province of the jury. Id., 683 P.2d at 681-82, 204 Cal.
Rptr. at 682-83.
186. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 377, 683 P.2d at 681-82, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 682-83.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The court stated that "[o]nce the jury has ascertained the amount of future damages-and has thus identified the amount of damages subject to periodic payment--we believe that
the court's authority under [CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE] §667.7, subdivision (b)(1), to fashion the
details of a periodic payment schedule does not infringe the constitutional right to jury trial."
Id., 683 P.2d at 681, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 682. The special verdict procedure allows the court
to submit to the jury written questions to ascertain what portion of the total damages awarded
were compensation for future damages. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
190. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fred J. Hiestand at 29, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
Civil No. S.F. 24336 (Cal. Supreme Court filed Nov. 10, 1981) (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
191. 66 Cal. 2d 821, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1967).
192. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fred J. Hiestand at 29, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
Civil No. S.F. 24336 (Cal. Supreme Court filed Nov. 10, 1981) (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
193. Although remittitur is a 150-year-old practice, some commentators contend remittitur
is falling out of favor. Wenske, Mo. Judges Ordered to End Reduction of Jury Awards,
NAr'L L.J., Vol. 7, No. 45, July 22, 1985, at 4. The Missouri Supreme Court recently
abolished the discretionary authority of state trial and appeals court judges to reduce
injury awards when they believe damages awarded by the jury are excessive. Citing discretionary abuse and inconsistent application of the procedure, the Missouri Supreme Court fully
restored multimillion-dollar verdicts for two people injured in the 1981 collapse of skywalks
in the Hyatt Regency Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri. Id.
194. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 377, 683 P.2d at 681-82, 204 Cal. Rptr, at
682-683.
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statutory objective of compensating an injured plaintiff,

on the special verdict procedure is appropriate.

96

95

reliance

The court stated

in conclusion that as with other innovative procedures and doctrines,

trial courts will deal with new problems in a case by case fashion.
Appellate courts will fill in gaps in the statutory scheme.'

8

'

Since the

California Supreme Court has recognized the power of the legislature
to provide for structured awards,' 9 9 extension of the MICRA periodic
payment provision to all negligence actions should pass constitutional

review. Governmental interests in reducing the cost of insurance and
maintaining coverage availability are served by extension and are
analogous to the interests served by MICRA. The liability insurance
coverage problems to be solved are more widespread than analogous
problems that existed when MICRA was enacted. 200 In addition, the
evidence indicates that the reforms of MICRA lowered medical
malpractice insurance premium costs. 20 Therefore, application of the
MICRA periodic payment provision to all negligence actions should
ameliorate insurance coverage problems faced by negligence defendants in general.20 2
The objections raised by the three dissenters in American Bank &
Trust, however, cannot be ignored and take on special significance
when considered in light of the case history.20 3 In his dissenting opinion,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §667.7(0.
196. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 872 (1975) (applying special verdicts in the field of comparative negligence, the court
said the special verdict procedure "can be of invaluable assistance" to the court). See supra
note 189 and accompanying text.
197. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 378, 683 P.2d at 682-83, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. When American Bank & Trust was first heard by the California Supreme Court, the
court found the periodic payment provision unconstitutional. 33 Cal. 3d 674, 190 Cal. Rptr.
371 (1983), rehearing granted, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984). Upon
grant of rehearing, that decision was vacated. Each time American Bank & Trust was heard,
the court split in a 4-3 decision. In the first case, which held the periodic payment provision
unconstitutional, the majority was comprised of opinion author Justice Mosk, Chief Justice
Bird, Justice Rattigan and Justice Racanelli, the latter two assigned to the court as pro tem
by Chairperson of the Judicial Council. In the same opinion, dissenters included author Justice
Kaus, Justice Broussard and Justice Feinberg, the latter assigned to the court as pro tem by
the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. On rehearing, the majority, which found the periodic
payment provision constitutional, was comprised of author Justice Kaus, Justice Broussard,
Justice Grodin and Justice Feinberg, the latter assigned to the court as pro tem by Chairperson
of the Judicial Council. The dissent included author Justice Mosk, Chief Justice Bird, and
Justice Rattigan, the latter assigned to the court as pro tem by Chairperson of the Judicial
Council. The chart below illustrates the change in court personnel:

195.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17

Justice Mosk argued that periodic payments provide benefits to the
wrongdoer at the expense of the victim. 2 0 4 In agreement with this view
was Chief Justice Bird, who pointed out in her dissenting opinion
that the wrongdoer is relieved of liability for continuing payment of
future damages not designated as lost income after the death of the
plaintiff.10 5 These arguments ignore the general policy decision made
when MICRA was enacted that all interested parties must sacrifice
06
in order to reach a fair and rational solution to the insurance crisis.
The interested parties included physicians, attorneys, insurance companies, and patients alike. 7 Various interests had to be counterbalanced to achieve a viable legislative solution in the public interest. 0 8 In
some cases defendants or defendants' insurers may be relieved of paying future damages because the plaintiff dies earlier than expected.
In most cases, however, full damage awards will be paid out and
savings to insurers will result from the insurer's ability to maintain
stable investments.2 0 9 The overall result will be to halt insurance

MAJORITY/UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Mosk
Bird
Rattigan (pro tem)
Racanelli (pro tern)

DISSENT/CONSTITUTIONAL
Kaus
Broussard
Feinberg (pro tem)

MAJORITY/CONSTITUTIONAL
DISSENT/UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Kaus
Mosk
Broussard
Bird
Grodin
Rattigan (pro tem)
Feinberg (pro tem)
The appointment of Justice Grodin to the bench subsequent to the first hearing seemingly changed
the result of the case. Future appointments may alter the result in the context of additional questions that arise regarding application or extension of MICRA provisions.
204. American Bank & Trust, 36 Cal. 3d at 377-78, 683 P.2d at 682, 204 Cal. Rptr. 683-84.
205. Id. at 388-89, 683 P.2d at 689-90, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
206. KEENE, supra note 4, at 27, 29.
207. Id.
208. Id at 33.
We pushed for a comprehensive approach. There were several reasons: first, no
piecemeal solution to the problem was possible. Second, by pitting the various concerned and powerful interest groups against one another, while preserving the delicate
balance among them, we had a better chance of getting something out. This is called
the "equal bite" theory behind [MICRA]. Third, it was essential to have a bill of
sufficient magnitude to command media attention and concentrate public support.
[MICRA] was supported by the California Medical Association but it was also supported by consumer groups, union organizations, senior citizen groups, and county
boards of supervisors. In short, the comprehensive nature of [MICRA] assured great
public sympathy in support of the bill and precluded any attempt by one interest
group to kill it in any specific committee.
Id.
209. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
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premium increases 21° and to continue insurance availability. All parties
to a negligence suit and the state would benefit from this result.
Therefore, the periodic payment provision of MICRA should be
extended to all negligence actions.
MICRA

PROVISIONS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR EXTENSION

The two major MICRA provisions not recommended for extension

are abrogation of the collateral source rule2"' and the limitation on

recovery for noneconomic damages. 21' 2 Although both of these provisions were held constitutional in the MICRA challenge cases, 213 policy
reasons dictate that the provisions should not be extended. Abrogation of the collateral source rule will be discussed first, followed by
consideration of the cap on recovery of noneconomic damages.
A.

Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule

The effect of the traditional collateral source rule is to prevent tortfeasors and their insurers from receiving the benefits of collateral source
funds created through the prudence and foresight of the injured
plaintiff. 2'1 MICRA's abrogation of the collateral source rule is in
accord with the express policy of California courts to prevent double
recoveries for the same injury.2" 5 This policy promotes the tort recovery
purpose of making the injured plaintiff whole. 21 6
Nevertheless, the collateral source rule survives in most jurisdictions217 for several reasons. First, requiring tortfeasors to compensate
victims deters further negligence by penalizing tortious behavior. ' 8
210. Report to the CaliforniaCitizens' Commission on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability
Balance, supra note 68, at 150.
211. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
214. Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit District, 2 Cal. 3d 1, 9-10, 465 P.2d
61, 65-66, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177-78 (1970). "Collateral source funds are usually created through
the prudence and foresight of persons other than the tortfeasor, frequently including the injured person himself. They are intended for the benefit of the injured person, and not for
that of the person who injures him. That intention should be effectuated." Gypsum Carrier,
Inc. v. Handelsman, 397 F.2d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1962): Accord, Grayson v. Williams, 256
F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958).
215. Compare Cal. Civ. Code §3333.1 with Lyons v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board, 44 Cal. App. 3d 1007, 1015, 119 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165 (1975); City and County of San
Francisco v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 267 Cal. App. 2d 771, 773, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 429, 430 (1968); but cf. Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 725, 729-30, 484 P.2d 599,
602, 94 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1971) (widespread public policy support for collateral source rule).
216. Schwartz, The CollateralSource Rule, 41 B.U.L. REv. 348, 349 (1961).
217. Moceri & Messina, supra note 49, at 311; Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv. L. REv. 741, 742 (1964).
218. See, e.g., City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co., 66 Cal. 2d 217, 227,
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Second, awards are often considered inadequate because juries do not
consider attorneys' fees and costs." 9 Finally, the tortfeasor should
not, as a policy matter, receive the benefits of the victim's providence.2"' Abolition of the collateral source rule increases the potential for a well insured plaintiff to relieve a negligent defendant of
all liability for damages.22 ' Eventually, the shift in whose insurer covers
the injury could result in increased insurance premiums for the injured victims.222 This result is inconsistent with fundamental fairness
22 3
principles.
Commentators argue that the collateral source rule is outdated. 24
Modernly, many injured people have significant sources of compensation other than the tortfeasor. 225 In addition, since the cost of
compensating injured persons is spread among the public, the question of which insurer pays the damages is academic. 226 Shifting the
burden of payment for damages incurred from the defendant's insurer to the plaintiff's insurer is advocated by commentators who argue
that liability insurance already has revolutionized the law of torts. 227
This revolution is claimed to have rendered the rules of negligence
obsolete, since as a practical matter courts offer only passing regard
to the formula while in fact looking to the insurance.228 Court opinions in tort cases, however, do not mention insurance as a reason
for holding the defendant liable.2 29 Liability insurance does not create
the liability, but only provides for indemnity once liability has been
proved. 230 However, California courts do weigh the relative financial
424 P.2d 921, 926, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1967); Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and
Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1478, 1483 (1966).
219. Comment, Recent Developments in Medical Malpractice Law, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 163,
193.
220. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
221. Because CAL. CIV. CODE §3333.1 allows evidence of the plaintiff's collateral sources
to be introduced, a possibility exists that damages awarded to the plaintiff will be reduced
to the extent of the plaintiff's own insurance recovery. Bell, supra note 63, 944-45. Prior to
enactment of MICRA, the plaintiff would have recovered fully from the negligent defendant. Id.
222. To the extent that plaintiff's insurer pays damages that prior to MICRA would have
been paid by the defendant, general liability insurance premiums may be raised to offset the
shifted burden of payment. Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1425, 1449 (1975).
223. Id.
224. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fred J. Hiestand at 17, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
Civil No. S.F. 24336 (Calif. Supreme Court filed Nov. 10, 1981) (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
225. Id.-For example, many people carry their own insurance coverage, or are covered under
workers' compensation or employer insurance plans. Id.
226. Id.
227. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §83 at 547 (4th ed. 1971).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 553.
230. Id.

1986 / Extending MICRA

resources of the respective parties in negligence actions to determine
who can best bear the loss.23 1 Since defendants in tort cases are primarily public utilities, commercial enterprises, industrial corporations and
inevitable losses
automobile owners, these defendants can distribute
23 2
by means of rates, prices, taxes, or insurance.

Courts and legislatures also have considered the prophylactic effect
of preventing future tortious conduct by holding the tortfeasor liable

for compensating the victim.233 Since people know they may be held
liable for their wrongs, a strong incentive exists to prevent injuries
from occurring.234 The deterrent effect of liability on potential tortfeasors is persuasive in determining that extension of the MICRA provision abrogating the collateral source rule would have a detrimental
societal impact.
Advocates of extending abrogation of the collateral source rule argue

that by eliminating double recoveries insurance rates will decrease.235
Since consideration of collateral sources and offsetting collateral
recovery from the award are discretionary, however, extension of this
MICRA provision does not guarantee lower rates.236 Pre-MICRA
estimates indicated that abrogation of the collateral source rule would
reduce malpractice insurance costs less than two percent.237 Other commentators who addressed the probable impact of abrogating the collateral source rule, however, claimed the new rule would have greater
239
effect.238 This prediction was verified in states that mandate offset.
Discounting for collateral source payments in ascertaining the damage
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Comment, The Collateral Source Rule: Double Recovery and Indifference to Societal
Interests in the Law of Tort Damages, 2 UNIv. OF PUGET SOUND L. REv. 197, 211 (1978).
These costs are substantial; studies show that costs to the insuraice industry as a whole in
satisfying subrogation rights is 60% of total overhead costs. Moreover, with repeal of
the collateral source rule and subrogation, "claimants are more likely to settle . . . because
there is a single plaintiff with a loss already partly satisfied and therefore a smaller claim."
Fleming, supra note 218, at 1536.
236. See KEEN, CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS, A LEGLISLATOR's GUIDE To THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE, supra note 4, at 29 (MICRA abrogation of collateral source rule
is discretionary).
237. AB IXX Premium Savings Estimated by the Insurance Commissioner, reprinted in
Sulnick, Medical Malpractice Reform Act (1975): The Failure of AB IXX (Keene) to Deal
with Medical Malpractice--A Constitutional Tragedy, 15 CAL. TRIAL LAW. ASSN. J. 17, 59
note 104 (1976).
238. Bell, supra note 63, at 944-45.
239. Under MICRA, the defendant may introduce evidence of plaintiff's collateral source
benefits, but the jury is not bound to reduce damage awards because of collateral source benefits.

See

CAL. CIV. CODE

§3333.1.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17

award resulted in lower total payments by defendants in litigated cases
when the plaintiff was insured.2" ' In addition, lower settlement
payments resulted. 4 ' The number of claims also dropped, possibly
42
because claims with low expected payouts were not brought.
The American Bar Association estimated prior to the enactment
of MICRA that the MICRA provision abrogating the collateral source
rule would reduce malpractice payouts by about twenty percent.2 '
Empirical evidence gathered subsequent to the enactment of MICRA
and similar reforms adopted nationwide substantiates these
predictions. 4 4 In states that legislatively require subtraction of collateral source payments from awards, the post-malpractice reform
awards were fifty percent lower in 1977 than they had been in 1975.245
Not only did evidence show that abrogation of the collateral source
rule actually reduced malpractice insurance premiums in states that
mandated offset, " '6 this MICRA provision also was found constitutional by the California Supreme Court in Barme v. Wood.241
Despite positive statistics and the probable constitutionality of
statutory abrogation of the collateral source rule in all negligence
actions, 24 8 extension of this MICRA provision is not recommended.
Diminishing a defendant's accountability for negligently caused injuries

by shifting the risk of loss destroys the deterrent effect of tort
240.

Bell, supra note 68, at 945.

241.

Id., See, e.g., P.M.

DANZON

& L.A. LILLARD, TmE REsoLurioN

OF MEDICAL MALPRAC-

TICE CLAims, 43, 55 (1982).

242. See, e.g., id. at 10-12, 44. A person injured by medical malpractice may need a minimum
$30,000 claim before an attorney may be found who will take the case. Id. But cf. supra note
85 (experience of New Jersey with access of the poor to the courts)
243. S.LAw & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 148 (1978).
The American Insurance Association estimated that a dollar-for-dollar offset for collateral sources
would reduce insurance premiums by 10 to 15%. Id.
244. P.M. DANzoN, supra note 241, at 30.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
247. 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984). The Court in Barne held
that precluding a collateral source that has provided benefits to a medical malpractice plaintiff
from obtaining reimbursement from the defendant does not violate due process or equal protection. The court found the MICRA provision abrogating the collateral source rule was rationally related to two legitimate state purposes. These purposes were to restore insurance
premiums to an affordable cost and to assure insurance availability. The court further stated
that due process does not require the legislature to tie liability invariably to fault. By shifting
some of the costs of malpractice from the negligent defendant to the plaintiff's own insurer,
some recovery for the plaintiff was assured. On the other hand, insisting that malpractice defendants and their insurers bear all of the loss might have resulted in malpractice insurance
unavailability or many doctors practicing without insurance. Thus, the court approved the constitutionality and underlying policy of MICRA even without considering the post-MICRA empirical studies showing success in reducing malpractice insurance premiums. Id. at 180-82, 689
P.2d at 449-51, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 819-21.
248. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 166, 695 P.2d at 685-86, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 389; Barine, 37 Cal.
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liability.249 The result is that the state's interest in preventing injury-

causing behavior is undermined.2 5 Abrogation of the collateral source

rule would make defendants less accountable for negligence.25' In
addition, the fact that plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees must be
paid from the plaintiff's award means that recovery from collateral

sources is not a double recovery, but actually provides a closer approximation to full compensation.2 52 Finally, the California Supreme

Court stated in Grayson v. Williams" 3 "[N]o reason in law, equity or
good conscience can be advanced why a wrongdoer should benefit from
a collateral source .... If there must be a windfall certainly it is more
just that the injured person shall profit therefrom, rather than the
wrongdoer ... "254 Thus, the policy reasons in Grayson2" coupled with
the tradition of holding a defendant responsible for tortious conduct,
provide strong arguments against abrogation of the collateral source rule

as in MICRA.
B.

Cap on Recovery of Noneconomic Damages

The final MICRA provision considered for extension is the $250,000
cap on noneconomic damages. 25 6 Extension of the recovery cap is not

recommended for policy considerations relating to full compensation of
a plaintiff for injuries. These policy reasons will be discussed after a brief
review of the constitutional challenge of the cap on due process and equal
protection grounds.
The weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports the due process and equal protection constitutional challenges of this MICRA
provision. 25 7 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court in Fein v. Perm3d at 174, 689 P.2d at 450, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 820. The constitutionality of this MICRA provision was challenged again by petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. Fein, Docket
#A579 U.S. filed June 24, 1985, cert. denied 474 U.S.
(1985) (notes on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
249. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, §4 at 23 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, Medical Malpracticein North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 1214, 1219 (1976); Shore, supra
note 4 at 9. But see Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD.
L. REv. 489, 505 (1977) (eliminating collateral source rule will have little effect on deterrence
of malpractice).
250. This result was forecast by the Ohio Supreme Court. Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E. 2d
832, 838 (1976).
251. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
252. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 176-77, 695 P.2d at 692-94, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 359-97 (Bird
C.J., dissenting).
253. 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
257. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 169-70, 695 P.2d at 687- 89, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 390-92. (Bird,
C.J., dissenting) (no rational relation when the most severely injured are arbitrarily designated
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anente Medical Group held the means selected in this provision were rationally related to the legislature's goal of reducing medical malpractice
insurance premium costs.258 Despite the finding of constitutionality, the

effectiveness of the cap on noneconomic damages is diminished by several
factors. First, paid-out damage awards constitute only a fraction of insurance premium costs.259 Second, very few plaintiffs suffer noneconomic
damages over $250,000.26o Therefore, not only is the relation between
the means chosen and the goal sought extremely tenuous, but only the

few severely injured plaintiffs are selected to bear the burden of this limitation on recovery. 261 MICRA has the effect, through this provision, of

denying full recovery to plaintiffs who have demonstrable noneconomic
losses exceeding $250,000.262

In California tort law, tortfeasors are held accountable for damages
proximately caused by their negligent behavior.2 63 This rule, combined
with the historic policy of providing full compensation for negligently
to bear the burden of limited recovery). A majority of the courts that have addressed the constitutionality of noneconomic damage limits have found them invalid. See, Wright v. Central
DuPage Hospital Association, 347 N.E. 2d 736, 743 (1976) (the damage limit on a workers'
compensation claim is statutorily created and may not be used by analogy to justify damage
limits on common law actions); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980) (cap of $250,000
for pain and suffering or other noneconomic loss creates an arbitrary damage limitation and
violates the principles of equal protection); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W. 2d 125, 136 (N.D.
1978) ($300,000 limitation on recovery in medical malpractice cases is a violation of the equal
protection provision of the North Dakota Constitution and of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E. 2d 903, 906-907
(dictum) (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas. 1976) (may not confer benefits on malpractice defendants
through a statutorily created damage limitation and thus deprive plaintiffs of benefits available
to others); cf. Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 877, 555 P.2d 399, 416, cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976) (remanding for factual determination whether a medical malpractice crisis existed); but see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. 404 N.E. 2d 585, 601 (1980)
(limitation imposed upon damages recoverable under malpractice act held consistent with requirements of privileges and immunities clause of the Indiana Constitution, the prohibition
of Indiana Constitution against special legislation, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution).
258. 38 Cal.3d 137, 162, 695 P.2d 655,682, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385 (1985).
259. Jenkins & Schweinfurth, California'sMedical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An
Equal Protection Challenge, 52 So. CAL. L. REv. 829, 940, n.666 (1979).
260. Id. at 951. DeCarteret, High Court Passes on Pain Price Curb, L.A. DAILY J., Feb.
2, 1979, at 1, col. 6, at 20, col. 4; Jones, supra note 257 at 874-75, 555 P.2d at 414-15
(nationally, fewer than one percent of all awards in 1970 exceed $100,000). But see RPowr
oF THE California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability Balance,
supra note 68, at 101, 114 (showing a clear upward spiral in the amount of payments per
claim in personal injury and medical malpractice cases between 1970 and 1976).
261. See, e.g., Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 169-70, 695 P.2d at 687-89, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 390-92.
(Bird, C.J., dissenting); Carson, 120 N.H. 2d at 943-44, 424 A.2d at 838. The Carson court
struck down a provision identical to the MICRA cap, saying, "[it is simply unfair to unreasonably
impose the burden of supporting the medical industry solely upon those persons who are most
severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation." Id.
262. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 169-70, 695 P.2d at 687-89, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 390-92. (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
263. Jenkins & Schweinfurth, supra note 265, at 954.
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inflicted injuries, deters unreasonable conduct.26" A limitation on
noneconomic damages reduces the deterrent effect garnered by historical

precedent, and thereby reduces the protections afforded California

citizens. 26 5 For the impoverished plaintiff, noneconomic damages can

provide the principal source of compensation for decreased lifespan or
loss of physical capacity. 266 An impoverished plaintiff may be unable

to prove substantial loss of future earnings or other pecuniary damages
in order to secure economic damages.267 In addition, while a $250,000
cap may sound generous, most large recoveries occur in cases involving
26
permanent damage to infants or to previously healthy young adults. 1
When spread over the expected lifespan of such a plaintiff, $250,000 is

insignificant.

269

Proponents of a cap on noneconomic damages argue that a high pain

and suffering award may result in a windfall to the deceased plaintiff's
heirs. 270 However, no danger of such a windfall exists because the amount

awarded for future pain and suffering will be subject to the MICRA provision for periodic payment of future damages whenever such damages
meet or exceed $50,000.271 Only damages relating to lost future income
that would devolve to dependents is continued beyond the lifespan of
the injured plaintiff. 27 2 Thus, the amount the jury determines will com-

pensate the plaintiff for noneconomic damages will be received by the
plaintiff as these noneconomic damages continue throughout the plain2 73
tiff's life.

Two proposals have emerged that would alleviate the policy problems
attending extension of the MICRA cap on noneconomic damages. The

first is an exception that would permit the jury to exceed the cap when
presented with special circumstances.

"

Another suggestion is the

establishment of a permanent State Commission on Pain and Suffering
264. Id. "[Ain alternative analytical approach, which focuses more directly on the determinants of an individual's behavior, would be a more fruitful guide [than economic considerations] to judgments about the deterrent effects of liability rules." Bell, supra note 63, at 975.
265. Jenkins & Schweinfurth, supra note 259, at 955.
266. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 170-72, 695 P.2d at 688-90, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391-93 (Bird, C.J.
dissenting).
267. Id., 695 P.2d 688-90, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391-93.
268. Id.
269. Id., 695 P.2d 688-90, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92.
270. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
274. For example, the state of New Jersey currently limits contingency fees for all personal
injury actions, and has included a statutory provision for exception from the ceiling amount
when the court finds special circumstances, including an exceptionally difficult case. NEw JERSEY
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Standards.275 This Commission would be charged with the duty to develop
sample standards of reasonable pain and suffering awards fitted to typical
fact situations.276 The proposed statute would require the courts to instruct
juries about the standards, but would not require adherence to the standards in review of decisions for the purpose of additur or remittitur.2 "
Either of these proposals would make a cap on noneconomic damages
more responsive to the individual plaintiff's proven damages. Thus, many
of the policy concerns regarding arbitrary capping of noneconomic
damages would be answered. Without adaptation of the capping provision to solve problems regarding full compensation to the injured plaintiff and similar treatment for similarly situated plaintiffs, the MICRA
cap on noneconomic damages is not recommended for extension.
CONCLUSION

Increasing general liability insurance premiums and decreasing
insurance coverage availability are causing problems similar to those faced
by the medical profession before 1975. The enactment of MICRA solved many of the problems of the medical malpractice crisis. Extension
of MICRA provisions relating to attorneys' fees and periodic payments
to all negligence actions would be a positive step toward restoring balance
to the California tort recovery system. The underlying purpose of tort
recovery, making the plaintiff whole, would be protected under the two
proposed extensions. Valuable societal controls on negligence that result
from the deterrent effect of holding defendants accountable for acts and
omissions would also be maintained under the extension proposal. The
extended provisions would add a protective dimension by shaping a defendant's liability to prevent bankruptcy or insolvency. Valuable CaliforRULES OF GENERAL APPLICATION 1:21-7(f). By analogy, California could include in a MICRA
extension of a cap on noneconomic damages an exception mechanism that would be triggered
on special circumstances. An example would be when a particularly young plaintiff is completely disabled or greatly disfigured as a result of the injury. The counterargument is that

this built-in escape valve from the statutory limitation may result in disparate treatment of
similarly situated plaintiffs unless the exceptional circumstances required to avoid the cap are
narrowly defined. On balance, however, this compromise position might curb ever-increasing

judgment awards while providing the same safeguards as additur. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. See generally Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury: The Continuing Creation
of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law, Report to the ABA, 1984, at 5-181

(for a discussion of other alternatives to the question of how to place limits on noneconomic
damages).
275. REPORT

OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS'
LIABILITY BALANCE, supra note 68, at 151.

COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM,

RIGHTING THE

276. The Commission unanimously recommended that the legislature establish a Commission on Pain and Suffering Standards. Id.
277. Id.
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nia businesses would be sustained as a result of structured awards, even
in the face of large judgments or settlements. An incentive to compromise
and settle would exist because attorneys' fees would absorb a smaller
portion of the injured plaintiff's recovery.
Extension of the sliding scale on attorneys' contingency fees and the
periodic payment of future damages would have an impact on insurance
premium cost and availability as evidenced by MICRA's impact on
medical malpractice insurance cost and availability. On the other hand,
extending the MICRA provisions abrogating the collateral source rule
and placing a cap on noneconomic damages would have a minimal impact
on insurance premium cost and availability. In addition, these two provisions would be detrimental to the important societal interests of holding
a tortfeasor accountable and fully compensating an injured plaintiff.
While the two provisions may be found constitutional if extended, strong
policy reasons militate against extension.
Ignoring the spiraling costs of insurance and the decreasing availability
of coverage can only result in placing California citizens at risk for
ensuring their own safety in all circumstances. California historically has
been a state with progressive laws that reflect an abiding concern for
the social welfare of citizens. 78 The progressive attitude of California
lawmakers should continue, while at the same time legislators consider
the changing reality of risk allocation. Extension of two of the MICRA
provisions would constitute a small step toward balance in the tort
recovery system and would be a meaningful safeguard for California
citizens and California businesses.
Jeanne C. Mann

278.

See supra notes 3, 15 and accompanying text.
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